Mechanism of cognition Kumārila regards validity of cognition (prāmān . ya) as a kind of capacity (śakti ). 5) This identification implies that validity, for Kumārila, has various features attributed to capacity in general.
6) Most importantly, in this context, it should innately exist in its locus. In other words, a cognition is valid from itself (svatah . ), not from something else (paratah . ) such as good qualities (gun . a). Therefore when a cognition arises, its validity, i.e. the capacity for a cognition to operate, arises simultaneously.
7)
Considering that a characteristic feature of a capacity (śakti ) is that it is an adr . s . t . a to be postulated by arthāpatti, one must conclude that validity is not grasped by its locus, i.e. cognition itself, but only postulated from the result of cognition. 8) Although it exists in a cognition innately and basically (utsargāt), it is exceptionally (*apavādena) cancelled when invalidity (aprāmān . ya) is brought about by a bad quality (dos . a) of a cause of a cognition. This point, which could be one of the weakest in his prāmān . ya-theory, is not expanded on much by Kumārila. But we can guess from the general characteristics of capacity that validity at this moment only conceals itself temporarily. A bad quality is removed by means of a good quality (gun . a) which also belongs to the same cause of a cognition. Then invalidity disappears and innate validity is secured (v. 65). But it is not the case that a good quality directly causes validity (vv. 47ab, 64cd).
Methods for negating an erroneous cognition From the vr . ttikāra onwards, the two methods mentioned above are formulated to discover and negate an error (*mithyājñāna). When one finds a bad quality (dos . a) in a cause of a cognition, one can know indirectly (arthāt) its invalidity (aprāmān . ya) and negate a preceding wrong cognition (v. 58). Or when one discovers that an object is otherwise than he has cognized, he directly knows the invalidity of a preceding cognition and negates it (v. 57ab). These two kinds of cognitions are called "negating cognition" (bādhakapratyaya/bādhakajñāna). But following the vr . ttikāra, it is common to use the term "negation" (bādha) to refer specifically to the latter process.
9)
dos . a
Mechanism of validity and invalidity in verbal cognition
In the context of verbal cognition, a good quality (gun . a) or a bad quality (dos . a) of a speaker (vaktr . ) determines a good or a bad quality of speech (śabda), which is in turn the direct cause of a hearer's cognition (v. 62). To explain, speech ceases to be a means of valid cognition (pramān . a) when a bad quality of a speaker is transferred into it (sam . krānti ). Conversely, speech keeps its status as a means of valid cognition when a good quality removes a bad quality and wards off its undesirable transference (v. 63ab).
The remaining mechanisms are the same as those of cognition in general. A good quality of a speaker removes a bad quality. Then speech is no longer regarded as an invalid means of knowledge (apramān . a) and stands as a means of valid cognition (pramān . a). Then invalidity of a verbal cognition is removed and innate validity stands (v. 65).
As we may suppose from Kumārila's work (vv. 22ab, 23, 102cd-110ab), good qualities of speech, derived from good qualities of the speaker, are of two kinds: the fact that it deals with an object that is known through another means of valid cognition (*pramān .ā ntaradr . s . t .ā rthavis . ayatva), and the fact that it has been uttered by an honest man (*āptoktatva). The former condition guarantees the correspondence between an object and a preceding means of valid cognition, while the latter guarantees that between an acquired information and speech.
10)
Securing validity in the case of a Vedic injunction The Vedas, being authorless, lack the only possible source of a bad quality, and therefore never themselves have a bad quality, though they do not have a good quality either.
11) But, because there is no possible source of a bad quality, they do not require a good quality from the beginning, which in the case of worldly statements (laukikam . vacanam) is required in order to guarantee the validity of verbal cognition. In consequence, the condition of not being a means of valid cognition (apramān . atva) never accrues to the Vedas, because they do not have the undesirable transference (sam . krānti ) of a bad quality (v. 68). Thus they keep their innate characteristic, i.e. being a means of valid cognition (pramān . atā). Therefore a cognition from a Vedic injunction never touches invalidity (aprāmān . ya) derived from a bad quality. Thus the innate characteristic of validity (prāmān . ya) remains in the cognition, without being cancelled.
gun . a ---⇒ dos . a ---apramān . atā -----/pramān . atā aprāmān . ya -----/prāmān . ya
| | | vaktr . --- ⇒ veda ⇒ jñāna
Impossibility of negating a cognition from a Vedic injunction It has become clear why a cognition from a Vedic injunction is ontologically faultless. A Vedic injunction is always a means of valid cognition (*codanā pramān . am eva).
12) This is why eternality (nityatā), or not being made by sentient beings (apaurus . eyatā), is required for protecting the authority of the Vedas (vv. 100cd-101a). However, as I mentioned above, one can deny an erroneous cognition by means of a later negating cognition (bādhakapratyaya), even though one could not point out a fault in its cause. For that one would need to show that a dharma, more concretely the relationship between cause and effect, e.g., yāga and svarga, is otherwise (atathābhāva) than a Vedic injunction teaches. But the domain of dharma is specifically allowed only to the Vedas, never to be approached by human perception. For perception and Vedic injunction, the two independent, primary and direct means of valid cognition, keep separate functional divisions. With regard to a dharma only a Vedic injunction is a means of valid cognition (*codanaiva pramān . am) (v. 4ab). This is why Kumārila (vv. 110cd-155) is so eager to deny an omniscient being, who could even grasp a dharma. We human beings, according to the Mīmām . sā system, can never obtain knowledge of a dharma without the teaching of the Vedas, just as a person blind from birth can never obtain knowledge of a particular color without the teaching of a non-blind person.
13)
Therefore it is impossible to deny a Vedic teaching by means of perception. As for the dependent, secondary and indirect means of valid cognition such as inference, because these are dependent on perception (Frauwallner's ed., 24.21: tanmūlatvāt; 22.19: pratyaks . apūrvakatvāt), they cannot overcome the limitations of perception. 
